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IN DEFENSE OF THE CHAPTER 9 OPTION: EXPLORING THE PROMISE OF
A MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AS A MECHANISM FOR STRUCTURAL
POLITICAL REFORM
Elizabeth M. Watkins*
"Any unit of local government, including municipalities. . . incurring any indebt-
edness, shall ... make payments . .. sufficient for the payment of the interest there-
on and the principal. . . "I
In 2012, this was easier said than done for many local governments. In 2011,
four municipal governments filed for bankruptcy protection under the rarely used
Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.2 That number included the largest
filing in U.S. history in Jefferson County, Alabama, a county with a population of
more than 600,000 and $3 billion in debt due to a sewer system deal gone bad.
Another milestone was reached this year when Stockton, California, a city of
292,000 residents, filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy and became the largest city in
U.S. history to default.4 Stockton was just one of three California cities to file with-
in a period of a single month and more are predicted to follow suit.6
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School. I'd like to thank my opinionated and expressive
father, my sister, my aunt Irene, Seema Shah and Joe Decenzo for indulging my interest through endless con-
versations and gratuitous editing. You guys are the best. Also, thanks to the SAEs and 2L staff for all their
hard work polishing the final product.
1. PA. CONST. art. 1, §10.
2. See Mary Williams Walsh & Katie Zezima, Small City Big Debt Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/business/rhode-island-city-files-for-
bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all (describing bankruptcy of Central Falls, Rhode Island); Mark Shade, UP-
DATE 4-Judge Dismisses Harrisburg, PA, Bankruptcy Filing, REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2011, 5:56 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/23/harrisburg-bankruptcy-idUSNIE7AM1OC20 111123
(describing how suit was preempted by a new state law prohibiting Chapter 9 filings); Katy Moeller, Boise
County Files for Bankruptcy, IDAHO STATESMAN (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.idahostatesman.com/201 1/03/02/1548057/boise-county-files-for-bankruptcy.html; Melinda Dick-
inson, Alabama County Files Biggest Municipal Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2011, 12:09 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 11/11/10/us-usa-alabama-jeffersoncounty-idUSTRE7A87WW20 111110
(describing bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Alabama).
3. See Dickinson, supra note 2.
4. See Michael B. Marois & Alison Vekshin, San Bernardino Third California City to Choose Bank-
ruptcy, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2012, 8:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-1 /san-bernardino-
third-califomia-city-to-choose-bankruptcy.html.
5. See id. The filing in Stockton was followed by a filing in Mammoth Lakes on July 3, a resort town
of approximately 8200 residents. Mammoth Lakes claimed insolvency after a $43 million dollar judgment,
twice the amount of the city's general fund, was entered against the city. San Bernardino filed for Chapter 9
on July 10 as a result of a $45 million dollar budget shortfall due to accounting errors, deficit spending, pen-
sion debts, and lack of revenue debt.
6. See Lawmakers Disagree Over Municipal Bond Default Risks, THE BOND BUYER (July 20, 2012),
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Still, the relatively low number of Chapter 9 filings is not the most salient indi-
cator of widespread financial distress. Several cities have found themselves on the
brink of insolvency and searching for last minute solutions to prevent default. In
April, the City of Detroit narrowly avoided takeover by a state appointed financial
manager and a possible bankruptcy filing by entering into a consent decree with the
state in an effort to close a nearly $200 million deficit.7 In another tale of despera-
tion, Mayor Chris Doherty of Scranton, Pennsylvania began paying city workers -
including police, firemen, and himself - the federal minimum wage in defiance of
a court order when the city could not meet its payroll.8
And the risk of financial distress is growing. Cities have found their budgets
overwhelmed by falling tax revenues at the same time that long term bills are com-
ing due.9 Critical financial indicators predict that the financial pain will likely in-
crease in the future.10  In this context, identifying solutions to the political ills that
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/l21_140/lawmakers-disagree-about-default-risk-104209 1-1 html. Speak-
ing of the risk of municipal bond defaults, Representative John Campbell of California's 48th Congressional
District predicted even more filings, saying that he "could not disagree more [that the risk of default is low],
coming from California where we've had three municipal bankruptcies-we probably will have nine more
very soon." Id.
7. See Union Workers in Detroit Talk of Wisconsin-like Battle Over Potential Loss of Bargin [sic]
Rights, FoxNEWS.COM (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/04/l I/union-workers-in-
detroit-talk-wisconsin-like-battle-over-potential-loss-bargin/. The consent decree gives the state broad powers
over Detroit's finances. Specifically the consent decree empowers a state appointed State Financial Advisory
Board to several ends: (1) to ensure compliance with the city budget; 2) to approve any debt issuance not oth-
erwise subject to approval under Act 34; (3) to approve the Revenue Estimate that serves as the basis for the
city's budget; and (4) to seek a court order for compliance with the terms of the consent decree. Further, the
Mayor and City Council are required to refrain from approving any Collective Bargaining Agreements that
are not approved by the state department of the treasury. CITY OF DETROIT, SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL STA-
BILITY AGREEMENT 1 (2012), available at
http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/mayor/pdf/Summary/20Of/20Final%20Version%20of%20FSA.pdf
8. See Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Unions Fight Scranton Mayor After He Cuts Pay to
Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/1 1/us/unions-fight-scranton-
mayor-after-he-cuts-pay-to-minimum-wage.html? r-1. The Mayor of Scranton cut city workers pay when
the city found itself with only $5,000 left in city coffers, and thus unable to meet actual payroll expenses. The
cause of the debacle was that the City Council's budget assumed the city would be able to borrow $16 million
dollars to meet operating expenses. But the city discovered to its dismay, that they had been frozen out of the
credit markets after the Scranton Parking Authority was late on payment for a city-guaranteed $1 million bond
payment. Id.
9. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNDERFUNDED STATE RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS AND THE ROAD TO REFORM 1 (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS-Assets/20 10/Trillion DollarGapUnderfundedStateRetirem
entSystemsand_the_Roads toReform.pdf. A 2010 report on the funding of state employee retirement
benefits concluded that end of the fiscal year 2008, there was a $1 trillion gap between the $2.35 trillion states
had set aside to pay for employees' retirement benefits and the $3.35 trillion price tag of those promises.
10. See Jennifer Depaul, Task Force: States Face Six Key Fiscal Threats, THE BOND BUYER (July 17,
2012), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121 137/budget-crisis-task-force-states-face-six-key-fiscal-threats-
1041948-1.html. In reference to a 2012 report issued by the Research Foundation of the City University of
New York's State Budget Crisis Task Force analyzing the finances of six states comprising nearly two-thirds
of the nation's population, former New York Lieutenant Governor Richard Ravitch said that, "the existing
trajectory of state spending, taxation and administrative practices cannot be sustained." The task force further
concluded that there are six primary fiscal threats, including underfunded pension liabilities, ballooning Medi-
caid spending, the prevalence of narrow and eroding tax base with volatile revenues, federal deficit reduction,
fiscal stress on local governments, and state budget laws that hinder stability. Id.
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underlie financial distress has become a growing and paramount public policy con-
cern.
In response to these fiscal challenges, states are taking action to prevent even
more Chapter 9 filings. Most prominently, some states have passed financial dis-
tress legislation that empowers state governments to commandeer a local govern-
ment's finances to prevent default and declare "financial martial law.""
Recent scholarship has argued that Chapter 9 bankruptcy is not a viable option
to address the underlying political ills that lead to financial distress. This is in part
because under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the bankruptcy court
lacks the legal authority to alter a locality's political structure. Rather, the state in-
tervention financial manager strategy is more promising because a state has the le-
gal authority to alter the locality's political structure by centralizing control of fi-
nancial decision making.
This Note argues that the Chapter 9 option, while politically and financially
painful, presents several advantages that make it a more viable option to effectuate
structural political reform than the state intervention financial manager approach,
and thus promotes long term fiscal health. These advantages include: (1) greater
disclosure and transparency; (2) the ability to politically mobilize key constituen-
cies; (3) the lack of vulnerability to external political influence; and (4) the ability
of bankruptcy stigma to create incentive for local government leaders to embrace
political reform on their own accord.
This Note will proceed by providing an overview of Chapter 9 itself, including
its benefits, costs, and causes. Second, it will provide background as to how states
approach the Chapter 9 option. Third, this Note will compare the advantages of
Chapter 9 with the state intervention financial manager approach as modeled in the
state of Michigan. It will conclude with a discussion of why this comparison is of
vital importance in the context of the nation's current economic climate.
Part 1: Background
A. History of Municipal Bankruptcy
Municipal bankruptcies are rarely used but were made accessible under the
1937 Municipal Bankruptcy Act.12 Before 1933 there was no federal or state mu-
nicipal bankruptcy legislation.13  Rather, municipal bankruptcy was governed by
11. See, e.g., MICH. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING PUBLIC ACT 4
OF 2011, THE LOCAL GOvERNMENT AND SCHOOL DISTRICT FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (Mar. 21, 2011),
available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/FAQs Act 4 348233_7.pdf The theory behind
such legislation is simple: when a local government has failed to make the political choices necessary to pre-
vent default, the state appoints an emergency manager who takes all the responsibilities of the local elected
officials. With broad powers, that financial manager restores balance to the city's books and returns govern-
ance back to political leaders. See id. See also Stephanie Condon, Michigan Bill Would Impose ""Financial
Martial Law, " CBS NEWS (Mar. 11, 2011, 5:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20042299-
503544.html.
12. See Henry W. Lehmann, The Federal Municipal Bankruptcy, 5 J. FIN. 241, 245 (1950).
13. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
912012-13]
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state common law which afforded various private remedies.14
Congress made its first attempt to pass municipal bankruptcy legislation in the
wake of the Great Depression. The 1933 Municipal Bankruptcy Act "permitted
(but did not require) [municipalities] to negotiate settlements of their debts with
creditors." Further, the Bill did not allow the court to assume jurisdiction or con-
trol over municipal finances. The U.S. Supreme Court swiftly responded by strik-
ing down the legislation on the grounds that the Act "might materially restrict re-
spondent's control over its fiscal affairs."l 6  Shortly thereafter, the Court changed
course by upholding the 1937 Act, which largely paralleled its predecessor.17 This
time, the Court, without providing factual distinction between the two cases, re-
versed course finding the Act to be a valuable aid to the exercise of a state's right to
enter into contracts.18
In subsequent amendments to Chapter 9, the scope of qualified municipalities
was expanded. The 1976 amendments eliminated the requirement that the debtor
municipality present a debt readjustment plan approved by the majority of creditors
prior to filing. 19 The effect is that now any municipality can file for Chapter 9-
regardless of whether the municipality created a debt readjustment plan prior to the
filing and regardless of whether a majority of creditors opposed the filing.20
Still, it is not easy to qualify for Chapter 9. There are several procedural re-
quirements that must be met before a municipality qualifies. First, the political sub-
unit must qualify as a municipality.21 Under current law, a state is not able to file
for bankruptcy.22 Second, the municipality must have the authorization of its state
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 425, 427 (1993).
14. See id. at 429-450 (providing examples of remedies including the seizure of public property and ju-
dicial oversight of city financial affairs).
15. Id. at 451. The 1933 Act's primary advantage was that it addressed the long problematic hold out
problem. Prior to the Act, when municipalities tried to negotiate with their creditors, minority creditors would
hold out for preferential treatment leading to the collapse of any readjustment deal. The 1933 act sought to
solve this problem by allowing a cram down of a readjustment plan when a certain percentage of creditors
(seventy-five percent in the initial bill) agreed. Id. at 450-51 (citation omitted).
16. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 530 (1936). The Court
further explained its hesitancy to allow congressional interference in the realm of municipal finance, explain-
ing, "[i]f obligations of States or their political subdivisions may be subjected to the interference here attempt-
ed, they are no longer free to manage their own affairs; the will of Congress prevails over them." Id. at 531.
Scholars have pointed out this reasoning was exceptionally weak because the 1933 Act required the state to
approve the bankruptcy petition itself, illustrating bankruptcy remained a province of state sovereignty. See
McConnell & Picker, supra note 13, at 451-52.
17. McConnell & Picker, supra note 13, at 452 (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)).
The only major differences between the 1933 Act and 1937 acts were that the new Act removed the require-
ment that the state approve the bankruptcy filing and replaced it with a requirement that the municipality be
authorized by state law to file and excluded counties from its purview. Id. at 453.
18. See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54. ("The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers. It
invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State itself is powerless to res-
cue. Through its cooperation with the national government the needed relief is given.").
19. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(e), 90 Stat. 315, 322 (1976).
20. Id.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006) (defining municipality as any "political subdivision or public agency
or instrumentality of a state").
22. See id. § 109(c) (describing who can be a debtor under Chapter 9).
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before filing.23 This approval can come in several forms (which will be discussed
in detail in this article). Authorization can range from unlimited statutory approval
to specific legislative mandate.24 Other requirements include that the municipality
must make a showing that it is insolvent (as determined by cash-flow basis), must
desire to effect a plan to restructure their debts, must negotiate in good faith with
creditors, and must show the petition was filed in good faith.25 The result is that it
is much harder to qualify for Chapter 9 than for other types of bankruptcy.26 How-
ever, once a municipality qualifies, the benefits are similar to those enjoyed by
commercial corporations. 27
B. Benefits and Costs of Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
A Chapter 9 filing provides a process for the reorganization of a municipality's
debt. Chapter 9 "authorizes municipalities in financial distress to employ the federal
power to impair contracts for the purpose of effecting municipal debt adjust-
ments."28 The benefits are similar to those offered to individuals and corporations
under Chapter 11,29 but more extensive.
Similar to Chapter 11 bankruptcy, municipalities are granted an automatic stay
when the petition is filed. The stay prevents any legal action against the munici-
pality, its officers, elected officials, employees and inhabitants without the express
permission of the bankruptcy court.30 The stay allows the municipal debtor
"breathing space . . . while it tries to work out its creditor and cash flow prob-
lems."3' For example, a stay allows a municipality to stop making "payments on
account of its pre-petition debt." 32 Even if in breach of contract, the municipality
remains immunized against a creditor who attempts to seize assets or collateral be-
fore the readjustment plan is put into action.33
23. Id. § 109(c)(2). See also HEATHER LENNOX & JOSEPH M. WITALEC, WESTLAW BUSINESS CUR-




24. See LENNOX & WITALEC, supra note 23, at 1.
25. Id.
26. For example, all it takes for a corporation to qualify for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 is that that the
debtor have a place of business within the United States. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
27. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 355 (2010).
28. Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 53 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 885, 890 (2002).
29. Chapter 11 bankruptcy allows a corporation to reorganize its debts to keep a company functioning.
See Chapter 11 Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapterl1.aspx (last visited Jan. 17,
2012).
30. JOHN KNOX & MARC LEVINSON, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: AVOIDING AND USING CHAPTER 9 IN
TIMES OF FISCAL STRESS 9 (2009), available at http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/1736.pdf (last visited No-
vember 15, 2012).
31. Id. at 10.
32. Kimhi, supra note 27, at 373.
33. See KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 30, at 10.
2012-13] 93
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The Tenth Amendment limits the authority of federal courts to interfere in lo-
cal governments' affairs. 34 The implication is that municipalities, unlike corpora-
tions filing under Chapter 11, maintain strict political control throughout the bank-
ruptcy process. This principal is codified in Section 904 of Chapter 9, which
prohibits the bankruptcy court from interfering with any political or government
power of the municipality, any property or revenue, or any income-producing prop-
erty of the municipality.3 5
The implications of these limitations are significant. For example, in corporate
bankruptcy, a judge can order that a company be liquidated if debtor-creditor nego-
tiations are not panning out.36 But Chapter 9 has no similar liquidation provision,
as is available under Chapter 7.37 The effect of this limitation is that there are no
mechanisms by which the bankruptcy court or creditors can force compliance with
the terms of the readjustment plan. If a municipal government fails to implement
the plan, the only enumerated power under Chapter 9 is for the bankruptcy judge to
dismiss the case.
Another example of the Tenth Amendment's limitations on the court is that the
municipal government can continue to borrow or incur further debt obligations -
even while in the middle of bankruptcy proceedings, 40 unless the debtor municipali-
ty consents to such a restriction. 41  This stands in contrast to Chapter 11 filings
which require compliance with all orders of the court.42
The municipality remains in control of the development of a plan for readjust-
ment of debts as well. Under Chapter 9, the municipality has the exclusive right to
submit a readjustment plan. This stands in contrast to Chapter 11, where a corpora-
tion's creditors have the right to contribute their own plans 120 days after filing. 43
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
35. See 1 I U.S.C. § 904 (2006).
36. See id. § 706.
37. Chapter 7 is the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code providing for "liquidation." Compare Chapter 9
Municipal Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited Jan. 12,
2012) (explaining that Chapter 9 does not provide for liquidation), with Chapter 7 Liquidation Under the
Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Jan. 12,
2012) (explaining that Chapter 7 is the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code providing for "liquidation").
38. See Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 37. A liquidation provision would
be a violation of a state's power to govern its own internal affairs. Because of this limitation, the bankruptcy
judge's job is generally limited to a) approving the initial petition b) confirming a plan of debt readjustment
and c) ensuring implementation of that plan.
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 930 (2006).
40. See, e.g., Chip Johnson, Voters, Not Leaders, Confront Vallejo's Mess, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2010,
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/johnson/article/Voters-not-leaders-confront-Vallejo-s-mess-3184800.php.
The loophole created by this limitation was evident in the 2008 Vallejo California filing where the City Coun-
cil created a political firestorm by approving a post-bankruptcy filing police contract that provided officers a
second year pay raise and free health care despite a $20 million budget deficit. Id
41. See II U.S.C. § 904.
42. See id §I 142(a).
43. Compare id. I 12i(c) (permitting creditors to file plan under Chapter 11), with id. § 941 (making
no reference to the ability of a creditor to submit a competing plan of debt adjustment under Chapter 9).
94 [Vol, 39:1
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Even so, the debtor's plan must still survive approval hurdles before it is confirmed
by the judge.44
One of the greatest advantages of the Chapter 9 option is that municipalities
have great leverage in the rejection of executory contracts, including collective bar-
gaining agreements. In Chapter 11, the dismissal of collective bargaining agree-
ments is subject to several procedural hurdles. 45 Under Chapter 9 the rejection pro-
cess is streamlined. 46
With the good comes the bad and there are also significant costs associated
with a Chapter 9 filing. First, there are transaction costs. A municipality must pay
legal and financial professionals to administer the case and to subsequently monitor
compliance with the reporting requirements of the readjustment plan. These costs
can easily range in the seven figures. 47 Of course, this carries the risk that the bank-
ruptcy court might reject the readjustment plan entirely48 or that creditors will re-
fuse to negotiate. This means the seven figure cost could be for naught.
There are opportunity costs as well. A Chapter 9 filing may serve as a tremen-
dous distraction to elected and other government officials who must field questions
about the filing and its administration. These tasks can overwhelm already under-
staffed or stressed local agencies. 49
A Chapter 9 filing may also bring stigma on the locality and the state. The
stigma associated with bankruptcy can disincentivize businesses from locating in
the community, resulting in fewer job opportunities, a decline in real estate sales,
and a general depression of economic conditions.50  Stigma may also affect the
productivity of the very municipal workers who are charged with the task of help-
ing a municipality exit successfully from bankruptcy. 5 There is also the prevailing
44. See id. § 943. A plan of debt readjustment is still subject to any state laws requiring regulatory or
electoral approval. Also, the plan must be deemed to be in the best interests of the creditors and deemed to be
feasible. Id.
45. See id. § 1113.
46. See Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 81 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 295, 297 (2007). Chapter 9 does not incorporate § 1113 which governs the rejection of CBAs in
Chapter 11. Courts have generally granted municipalities broader discretion than corporate entities filing un-
der Chapter 11. Id.
47. See, e.g., Dan Springer, Life After Bankruptcy: Problems Persist as Vallejo, Calif., Touts Efforts to
Bounce Back, Fox NEWS (July 31, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/31/vallejo-back-from-
bankruptcy/ (the City of Vallejo spent a total of$16 million on their 2008 bankruptcy filing).
48. See II U.S.C. § 943(b)(3) (2006).
49. Tasks may include "preparing for and attending hearings and depositions, responding to endless re-
quests for information and documents from creditors, rating agencies, collective bargaining units, elected offi-
cials and the public." KNox & LEVINSON, supra note 30, at 12.
50. Id.
51. See Talk of the Nation: What Happens When a City Declares Bankruptcy, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(July 11, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/156621232/what-happens-when-a-city-declares-bankruptcy.
The former interim City Manager for Vallejo, California described two reasons why employee morale is af-
fected: "When there's a label put across a city or a county or a special district that says, you're in bankruptcy,
it equates in the minds of the public to dysfunction ... [a]nd it is very difficult for the employees. They don't
want to be associated with a dysfunctional organization. It destroys morale." Id. This effect is heightened by




concern of bleed over into nearby communities.52
Further, a municipality filing for bankruptcy should be prepared for a suspen-
sion or downgrade of its credit ratings.53 This can result in higher borrowing costs
in the long term. These effects can last for years, though some municipalities have
quickly recovered after a Chapter 9 filing.54 Credit ratings affect not only the mu-
nicipality, but also the state as a whole indirectly. Specifically, a default in one lo-
cality can raise concerns about the lack of oversight at the state level. This fear
may spark more fear that other defaults will occur, bringing into question the cre-
ditworthiness of the state as a whole. Further, there are implications for the resi-
dents of communities that file for Chapter 9. Take for example, the case of Jeffer-
son County, Alabama where the County's filing has already resulted in layoffs and
cuts to essential services.56 It is no wonder municipalities do not often use this op-
tion. In total, 55,000 government entities can issue debt. 57 Of these, less than .05
percent (only 262) municipalities filed for Chapter 9 in the past thirty-two years.
Of the bankruptcy filings, relatively few are cities or towns. 59
C. The Causes of Default
There are several traditional causes of municipal debt default. Some of the most
commonly cited include general economic depression, bad investments, miscalcula-
tion regarding the feasibility of projects or industries, mismanagement, and default
created by manmade disasters.60 One scholar has conceptualized these causes ac-
cording to two primary categories: external factors (referred to as socioeconomic
causes) and those that are internal to the municipality (referred to as political cir-
cumstances).61 Socioeconomic causes are events a municipality cannot control.
Examples include an influx of immigrants, an unexpected judgment award, and a
52. LENNOX & WITALEC, supra note 23, at 3.
53. Id at I1.
54. See, e.g., MOODY'S Upgrades Ratings for Orange County, CA, CNTY. OF ORANGE (Sep. 23, 1999),
http://www.oc.ca.gov/press/1999/1999_Sep23.htm (Orange County California successfully exited bankruptcy
in June 1996. Less than three years later, Moodys raised the rating on $1.5 billion of outstanding debt).
55. See Kimhi, supra note 27, at 382-83.
56. See Richard Fausset, Alabama County has Filed Largest U.S. Municipal Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/20l 1/nov/10/nation/la-na-alabama-bankruptcy-201 11111. (noting
that Jefferson County, which is required by law to pass a balanced budget, laid off 550 employees, closed four
courthouses, and suspended road maintenance).
57. See Nicole Dueffert, Harrisburg and a Brief History of Municipal Bankruptcies, PEW CTR. ON
STATES, (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.pewstates.org/research/data-visualizations/harrisburg-and-a-brief-
history-of-municipal-bankruptcies-infographic-85899376574.
58. Dueffert, supra note 53.
59. Dueffert, supra note 53. Between 1980 and 2011, there were 232 Chapter 9 filings. Ninety-two of
the filings originated with municipal utilities, sixty-three special municipal districts, forty-nine city village and
counties, forty-two hospitals and healthcare centers, nine transportation projects, and six school districts.
Dueffert, supra note 53.
60. See James E. Spiotto, Historical and Legal Strength of State and Local Government Debt Financing
38-42 (Nov. 2010, Chapman and Cutler, LLP, Working Paper No. 2902133), available at
http://www.chapman.com/events/20101116/SpiottoWebinar-1 116 10.pdf.
61. Keeok Park, To File or Not to File: The Causes of Municipal Bankruptcy in the United States, 16 J.
PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT, 228, 241 (2004).
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drop in real estate prices.62 Internal factors refer to the political vulnerabilities of
local government actors. Generally these are causes that local government can con-
trol. These causes include government leaders caving to benefit expansions promot-
ed by special interest groups, engaging in speculative investments, general misman-
agement, or fraud. 63
A mix of internal and external factors is usually at play when a municipality de-
faults.64 In other words, while external socioeconomic factors can create an envi-
ronment that is ripe for default, political decision-making can also affect the out-
come by mitigating or even exacerbating the likelihood of default. A case study
illustrates the point. Orange County, California filed for Chapter 9 in 1994 because
of massive losses from speculative investments. Specifically, County Treasurer
Robert Citron invested approximately $7.6 billion from 194 local public agencies in
speculative and complex derivative instruments.65 Citron's strategy was to earn
higher yields on investments by overleveraging the pool by more than three-to-one
(for every three dollars used to purchase securities, about two dollars was borrowed
money).66 The success of the pool depended on stable interest rates. When interest
rates rose, the County did not have the financial resources to cover their losses and
promptly filed for Chapter 9 protection after banks began seizing the County's col-
lateral. 67
The cause of the Orange County default was a mix of both political and eco-
nomic factors. These political decisions were controlled by Robert Citron who con-
tinued to borrow and bet on low interest rates despite months of increases-
resulting in devastating impacts on the pool's principal.68 The effects, however,
were exacerbated by non-controllable economic factors. These factors included the
Federal Reserve's decision to unexpectedly increase interest rates and the influence
of Proposition 13, which prevented California municipalities from raising or impos-
ing new taxes without the approval of the local electorate, to cover the losses on the
pool.69
The perfect storm for municipal default includes both internal (political) and
external factors (socioeconomic)-some controllable and some not. The one con-
stant is that the underlying political structure (and decisions that come from it) has a
tremendous influence on the ultimate determination of whether or not a municipali-
ty defaults on its debt. The premise is simple. If the locality's political environ-
62. See id. at 241-42.
63. Id. Former Mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, Larry Langford, is a good example of an internal polit-
ical cause. In November 2011 he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for his role in corrupt business deals
that fueled the multi-billion dollar sewer debt that has caused Jefferson County to file for Chapter 9 protec-
tion. Matthew Bigg & Melinda Dickinson, Blame All Around for Biggest U.S. Municipal Bankruptcy, REU-
TERS (Nov. 10, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/201 1/1 1/10/us-usa-alabama-jeffersoncounty-
idUSTRE7A95CT20l 11110.
64. See Kimbi, supra note 27, at 380; see also Park supra note 61 at 251-52.
65. MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 90-91
(1998).
66. See id.
67. Id. at9l, 111.
68. Id. at 102-103.
69. Park, supra note 61, at 243-45.
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ment is enabled to make the necessary cuts a city will remain in good financial
health. But if a locality is not equipped to exercise fiscal restraint, then expendi-
tures will mount and a crisis will ensue.70
The ultimate question is: does the Chapter 9 option do anything to improve the
political structure that creates the economic mess in which so many localities find
themselves? Is it a more viable option to address the underlying political problems
than the financial manager approach? To answer that question we begin with an
analysis of state approaches to the municipal bankruptcy issue: who allows it, who
prohibits it, and a discussion of the most prominent alternative to the municipal the
Chapter 9 bankruptcy option.
Part 2: State Responses
Chapter 9 is not a mandate on the states. Rather, states must grant statutory
permission.71 This limit is designed to avoid conflicts with state sovereign rights.72
State approaches take one of three forms: (1) specific authorization 73, (2) con-
ditional authorization, and (3) outright prohibition.74  Because this section is fo-
cused on the alternatives to Chapter 9, states with specific and unconditional au-
thorization will not be discussed.
The least prevalent category is that of outright prohibition, meaning that munic-
ipal bankruptcy is simply not an option under state law. Two states that fall into
this category. Georgia has prohibited the use of municipal bankruptcy statutorily
without exception.75 Iowa has a similar limitation,76 but slightly more generous.
Municipalities are allowed to access Chapter 9 if their debt is involuntarily in-
curred.77
By implication, states without a statute authorizing Chapter 9 fall into the pro-
hibition category. Currently, twenty-one states lack any statutory authorization for a
Chapter 9 filing.78 Even if Chapter 9 is prohibited, historical remedies remain for
70. Kimhi, supra note 27, at 380.
71. See Daniel J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to be a
Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency - and What Will States Do Now?, 23
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1001, 1005 (1997) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006)). This change was put into effect
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, 4141, which amended 109(c)(2) to
require specific authorization by name to be a debtor. This is much more stringent than the previous reading,
which required only general authorization, which was interpreted inconsistently by the Courts. See id at
1001, 1005 n.35, 1006-1007 (citations omitted).
72. See Nicholas McGrath & Ji Hun Kim, The Next Chapter for Municipal Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., June, 2010, at 14 (citation omitted).
73. As of November 2010, sixteen states had specific unlimited authorization: Alaska, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Texas, and Washington, but California dropped off this list the following year-the current
list stands at fifteen.. See Spiotto, supra note 60, at 56; Freyberg, supra note 71, at 1008 n.66.
74. See Freyberg, supra note 67, for a discussion of four similar categorizations: states with plain au-
thorization, restricted authorization, states that prohibit, and states that provide for recomposition plans.
75. See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (West 2011).
76. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 76.16 (West 2011).
77. See id § 76.16A.
78. These states include Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Kansas, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota,
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distressed municipalities. 79 One example is the use of municipal bridge financing.
Another option is the transfer of government services to the state to reduce munici-
pal expenses.80  The problem is that these remedies depend on the assumption that
states themselves have the money to support their localities. Recent economic
trends illustrate this assumption is no longer safe.81
Conditional Authorization 82 and "Financial Martial Law" Legislation
Recently, states have moved to restrict access to Chapter 9. One explanation is
that states are concerned about the ripple effect a Chapter 9 filing can have on their
own borrowing potential and the borrowing potential of surrounding cities.
As of November 2010, eight states allowed for conditional access to Chapter
9. In 2011, California joined the list with the passage of Assembly Bill 506,
which bars local government agencies from filing for bankruptcy without first hold-
ing a public hearing and adopting a resolution, or, alternatively, by first participat-
ing in a neutral evaluation process with a qualified mediator.8 5 Indiana tried to fol-
low suit with the introduction of Senate Bill 105, which would have allowed for a
Chapter 9 filing only after the recommendation of a state appointed financial man-
ager, but the bill was not passed during the 2011 legislative session.
Restrictions to Chapter 9 can be mild, demonstrated by, for example, require-
Michigan, Indiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Vermont, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Alaska, and Hawaii. See Spiotto, supra note 60, at 56-57.
79. Id. at 94-95 (listing other options, including the use of state grant funds to bridge the crisis and the
use intercept of state payable taxes to pay for essential services.).
80. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-34-2(5) (West 2011) (stating that a municipal government has the
affirmative right to contract with the state for the provision of municipal services); see also Spiotto, supra
note 60, at 94.
81. See, e.g., Michael Corkery, New Jersey Seeks Loan to Plug Cash Shortfall, WALL ST. J., June 28,
2011, at C6. For example, the state of New Jersey recently had to subvert the bond market and negotiate for a
loan of $2.25 billion to fill a state budget gap-a highly unconventional practice. Private banks have seen an
increase in lending to states, schools, and other municipal entities. Id. 2012.
82. This title refers to states that have authorizing legislation but require some form of review or other
restriction before a city can file for Chapter 9. See Freyberg, supra note 71, at 1010 (citations omitted).
83. This is the explanation offered by recognized expert in municipal bankruptcy, James Spiotto, who
heads Chapman and Cutler's special litigation, bankruptcy, and workout practice. One of the risks of allowing
municipal bankruptcies is that the default of a single city can result in a hit to the state's credit ratings, and to
other cities as well. See Claire Zillman, Bankruptcy Bar? States Aim to Deny Distressed Cities Chapter 9 Op-
tion, AMLAW DAILY (July 13, 2011, 12:53 PM),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/07/chapter9.html.
84. These states included Connecticut, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island. See Spiotto supra note 60, at 56.
85. See CAL. Gov. CODE § 53760.3 (West 2011); see also Jim Sanders, Bankruptcy Bill Passes Assem-
bly and Heads to Jerry Brown, CAPITOL ALERT (Sept. 10, 2011 7:56 AM),
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2011/09/bankruptcy-bill-passes-assembl.html#storylink=cpy.m
86. See S.B. 105, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (which would authorize the appointment
of a financial manager by the state Distressed Unit Appeals Board and for that manager to recommend a
Chapter 9 filing).
87. See Senate Bill 0105, Archives (2011), Indiana Gen. Assemb.,
http://www.in.gov/apps/Isa/session/billwatch/billinfo?year-201 1&session=I&request--getBill&docno=105
(last updated April 21, 2011).
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ments that the locality first seek the approval of the local municipal finance com-
mission or seek the approval of the state attorney general and governor. Still oth-
er restrictions to Chapter 9 can be more extreme. Recent movement has been to-
ward what a Michigan state senator aptly refers to as the "financial martial law"
approach.89 This approach includes the state appointment of an emergency finan-
cial manager to commandeer municipal finance when a municipality is declared to
be distressed or in a state of emergency. This approach is designed as an option of
last resort before a municipality is allowed access to Chapter 9. Currently, more
than half of all states have financial manager legislation. 90
There are several critical features of this legislative approach. First, it gives the
state unilateral oversight power to monitor a locality's finances.91 Second, the state
has the authority to appoint a financial overseer who is granted broad authority over
local governance and finance.92 These overseers are also authorized to comman-
deer local government authority for an extended (often indefinite) period of time.93
The state of Michigan is recognized as having the most expansive financial
manager law in the nation. 94  In March 2011, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder
signed into law the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability
Act (PA 4).95 Under the Act's predecessor, Public Act 72 of 1990 (PA 72), Michi-
gan already had procedures in place that governed access to Chapter 9.96 That pro-
cess included three strategies in the event that a state declared a fiscal emergency:
(1) under consent agreement, a local government could negotiate with a state-
appointed, financial-review team; (2) a state-appointed emergency manager could
develop and implement a plan to resolve the crisis; and (3) if the emergency finan-
cial manager recommended, and the state approved, the local government could file
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.97 The emergency financial manager's authority was lim-
ited to financial activities.98 The 2011 Act expands this authority to include broad
88. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-40 (requiring only the approval of a local municipal finance
commission before a city can file for Chapter 9).
89. Condon, supra note 11.
90. See, e.g., Ryan Holeywell, Emergency Financial Managers: Michigan's Unwelcome Savior, Gov-
ERNING (May 2012), http://www.goveming.com/topics/mgmt/gov-emergency-financial-managers-michigan-
municipalities-unwelcome-savior.html.
91. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1512 (West 2011); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.602
(West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-3 (West 2011).
92. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1515 (West 2011); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
11701.602; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7.
93. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1515(8) (West 2011) (indefinite) (allowing the emergency
manger to continue its capacity until removal or the financial emergency is rectified); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
45-9-7 (West 2011) (indefinite), with 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.710 (West 2011) (two-year term with
possible extension).
94. See Holeywell, supra, note 90.
95. See H.B. 4214, 2011 Leg., 96th Sess. (Mich. 2011); see also Kate Linebaugh, Emergency Manager
Law Faces Challenge, Wall St. J., June 23, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304657804576401841344789736.html.
96. See MICH. HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: LOCAL GOVERNMENT & SCHOOL Dis-
TRICT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 1 (2011), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-
2012/billanalysis/House/pdfl201 I -HLA-4214-3.pdf.
97. Id. at 3.
98. See id. at 21. Public Act 72 of 1990 limited the Emergency Financial Manager's tasks to developing
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controls over municipal finance as well as all aspects of local governance.
PA 4 now provides the emergency manager with several new powers. Specifi-
cally, the emergency manager now has the ability to modify one or more terms of
existing city contracts or reject them outright, as well as the ability to temporarily
suspend any provision of collective bargaining agreements. 99  Under PA 72, the
emergency financial manager's role was limited to the renegotiation of contracts.100
Even more controversially, PA 4 also provides the emergency manager101 with
nearly unlimited political authority. For example, the emergency manager now has
the authority to unilaterally eliminate city departments, consolidate functions of
those departments, or at the most extreme, to appoint, supervise, and remove ad-
ministrators.102 Further, the emergency manager has the ability to take any action
or exercise the authority of any appointed or elected official.103
This power is on display in various cities. The City of Pontiac's emergency
manager unilaterally outsourced a slew of city services including building permit-
ting, water and sewer operations, income tax collection, payroll, trash pickup, IT
and cemetery operations.104 In Benton Harbor, Michigan, emergency manager Joe
Harris went even further than just decreeing major policy decisions by effectively
abolishing the authority of the City Commission.105
Still the state of Michigan is not alone in moving towards expanding the pow-
ers of financial managers. In 2011, Pennsylvania decided to effectively force dis-
tressed cities into the Municipal Financial Recovery Act ("Act 47") process by sus-
pending all access to Chapter 9 bankruptcy.106 Ordinarily, Pennsylvania law
allowed for localities to file Chapter 9 under Act 47.107 But now Pennsylvania has
revoked this right temporarily and coupled that revocation with sanctions. Act 26
(effective in June 2011) prohibits any municipality that is deemed to be financially
and implementing a financial plan that balanced expenditures with revenue and debt service. Id.
99. Id at 4-5.
100. See id. at 5.
101. The change in title of the overseer is significant. In PA 72, the appointee was known as the "emer-
gency financial manager" indicating limited authority to the city's financial affairs. Id. at 4. That title has now
been changed to "emergency manager" which indicates expansion of the manager's general political powers.
Id.
102. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.1519(l)(n) (West 2011).
103. See id. § 141.1519(1)(ee) ("[The emergency manager may] take any other action or exercise any
power or authority of any officer, employee, department, board, commission, or other similar entity of the
local government, whether elected or appointed, relating to the operation of the local government. The power
of the emergency manager shall be superior to and supersede the power of any of the foregoing officers or
entities.") (emphasis added).
104. See Holeywell, supra, note 90.
105. Mr. Harris's order ominously read: "'Absent prior express written authorization and approval by the
Emergency Manager'-himself-'no City Board, Commission or Authority shall take any action for or on
behalf of the City whatsoever other than: i) Call a meeting to order, ii) Approve of meeting minutes, iii) Ad-
joum a meeting."' Chris Savage, The Scandal of Michigan's Emergency Managers, THE NATION (Feb. 15,
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/166297/scandal-michigans-emergency-managers#.
106. See 72 PA. CONS. ANN. § 1601-D.1 (West 2011) (stating "no distressed city may file a petition for
relief under 11 U.S.C. Ch. 9 (relating to adjustment of debts of a municipality)"). The provision was, origi-
nally set to expire in July 2012 but was recently extended to apply through November 30, 2012. Id.
107. See 53 PA. CONS. ANN. § 11701.261.
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distressed under Act 47 from filing for Chapter 9. os If a municipality violates this
provision, all Commonwealth funding to that locality is suspended. 109 It forces all
municipalities into the Act 47 recovery process.1 10 If the governor declares a finan-
cial emergency, state powers (exercised through a receiver) over a locality's financ-
es are extensive. These powers include the ability to approve, disapprove, modify,
reject, or terminate contracts and the power to unilaterally assume the authority of
all elected or appointed officials of the distressed locality.'I1
Rhode Island has erected a tiered system over state oversight of local finance
that removes the Chapter 9 option from local control. In 2010, Rhode Island abol-
ished the previous system, which allowed for local control over municipal finances,
and replaced the system with a mechanism of state oversight.112 This new system
erects three hurdles before a city can access the Chapter 9 option. First, the state has
the authority to unilaterally appoint a fiscal overseer. The fiscal overseer can ex-
ercise control over municipal finances and is charged with the task of developing a
three-year operating plan for fiscal stability.114 If the overseer thinks it necessary,
he can recommend the appointment of a commission to exercise control over the
budget. The state appoints a receiver only if the budget commission makes a de-
termination that its powers are insufficient to restore fiscal stability.16 In turn, that
receiver can recommend a Chapter 9 filing. 17 As in Pennsylvania and Michigan,
the receiver's authority is extensivells and has already garnered controversy in the
recent Central Falls filing.119
Despite its controversy, there are several justifications for these expansive
powers. First, proponents of the financial manager legislation argue that cities that
find themselves in states of financial emergency have a long history of being ill-
108. 72Pa.CONs.ANN.§ 1601-D.I.
109. Id.
110. The approach in Pennsylvania is twofold. First the state can exercise involuntary oversight and de-
clare a locality to be in distress. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.201. A coordinator must develop a plan,
which can usually include a recommendation for a Chapter 9 filing. Id. §§ 11701.241-242. If the locality
does not implement that plan, all commonwealth funding is cut (with few exceptions). Id. §§ 11701.248, 251.
Second, the Governor can also declare a financial state of emergency if economic conditions warrant. Id. §
11701.602. The state has much more power under the declaration of financial emergency. For example, the
Governor can place the locality under receivership for an indefinite time period. Id. §§ 11701.702, 11701.705.
111. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.706.
112. Previously, the state could create a Budget and Review Commission only after a city's bond rating
was lowered by one or more recognized rating agencies. S. 2997, 2010 Leg., Gen. Assemb. § 45-9-3.(a)(1)
(R.I. 2010), available at http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillTextlO/SenateTextl0/S2997A.pdf. That Budget
Commission was comprised of local community members who had broad authority to impose taxes and to
make appropriations and necessary cuts. Id. § 45-9-3.(a)(2).
113. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-3(b) (West 2011).
114. See id. § 45-9-3(d)-(g).
115. See id. § 45-9-5.
116. See id. § 45-9-7.
117. See id. § 45-9-7(b)(3).
118. See id. § 45-9-7(c) ("Upon the appointment of a receiver, the receiver shall have the right to exercise
the powers of the elected officials under the general laws.").
119. See Abby Goodnough, One More Job Lost in the Recession: The Mayor's, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/us/22mayor.html?pagewanted=all (where the state appointed re-
ceiver demoted the mayor to advisory status after taking charge - publically ousting him when police knocked
on his door and confiscated his city car, cell phone, his key to City Hall, and then cut his salary).
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managed. Further, in the past when an emergency financial manager would come in
to help rectify the situation, those same officials would often obstruct their ef-
forts.120 Thus, expansive powers are necessary to allow reform efforts to take hold.
Proponents also argue the very threat of takeover has value, creating greater incen-
tive for the state, local labor leaders, and elected officials to renegotiate contracts
and voluntarily offer concessions that avoid state takeover. 121
Still, opponents generally argue that such expansive statutory authority invites
the possibility of corruption and cronyism,122 may well be a violation of Article I,
Section 10 of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from passing
laws that would impair lawful contracts,123 and does little to solve the long-term
structural political problems that lead to default in the first place.12 4
Part 3: Argument
Is municipal bankruptcy a viable option to obtain long-term financial stability
for distressed localities?
Scholars have argued that Chapter 9 is not a viable option to address the politi-
cal problems that cause a city to default because the bankruptcy court has no legal
authority to effect this change directly,125 but states do.126 Thus, state intervention
is the best method to cure the ills of the underlying political structure that creates
the financial mess.
Theoretically this is explained as the problem of political fragmentation.127
The argument holds as follows: in the absence of a central coordinator, self-
interested parties (politicians, special interest groups) will pursue their own self-
interest often to the detriment of the group as a whole. Thus, the solution to this
problem lies in the ability of a locality to centralize authority and by effect mini-
mize the possibility of financial mismanagement. The state takeover is a model of
this reasoning. Because the Chapter 9 process, due to Tenth Amendment limita-
tions on the bankruptcy court, cannot legally impose political defragmentation, 128a
Chapter 9 filing does not attend to a city's political problems. Put another way, a
120. See MICH. HOUSE. FISCAL AGENCY, supra note 96, at 23.
121. Id. at 23.
122. Id. at 24-25.
123. Id. at 24.
124. There is some evidence to support this contention. Between 2000 and 2002, the first emergency fi-
nancial managers were appointed in the cities of Hamtramck, Flint, and Highland Park to prevent them from
declaring bankruptcy. Although the emergency financial manager eventually left each city, all are now back in
the red. See Savage, supra note 105.
125. See Kimhi, supra note 27, at 380-81 (for example, a bankruptcy court cannot abrogate the authority
of local government leaders).
126. Id. at 386 ("Unless otherwise stipulated in the state's constitution, the state can take any action with
regard to its local governments, whereas the localities have only those powers delegated to them by the state.
These state powers, combined with the fact that the state controls a larger geographical area than each of its
cities, enable the state to better address the problems faced by cities.").
127. Id. at 378-79.
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2006) (expressly limiting the court's authority).
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Chapter 9 filing does not get rid of ineffective leaders. Further, even if it did, the
political structure itself remains intact.
The evidence illustrates this is an oversimplification of the benefits of the
Chapter 9 process. By design, Chapter 9 presents several key advantages over the
state intervention approach that makes it a more promising option to facilitate struc-
tural political reform. This section will discuss those advantages and explain how
those advantages have facilitated structural political reforms in the context of past
Chapter 9 filings. For the purpose of this note, the term political structure will ap-
ply broadly and will refer to any established change in the established pattern of re-
lationships between local government leaders and their constituents. 129
Advantage #1: Chapter 9 offers more disclosure
The first advantage is that the Chapter 9 process results in far more disclosure
than the state intervention approach. As a result, the cause of the default is more
likely to come to light. This disclosure increases the likelihood that the solutions
will address the underlying structural political problems. There are several reasons
why this is true.
First, the financial manager approach is limited to financial stabilization but is
not designed to uncover the political ills that created the problem. This is illustrated
by Michigan's statutory grant of authority to emergency financial managers. The
primary goal of the manager is not to study the underlying causes, but rather to de-
velop a financial and operating plan for the locality to ensure the continued provi-
sion of essential services.130 In fact, Michigan law makes it optional for a financial
manager to study the underlying cause, but this is not statutorily required.131 This
is similar to Act 47 in Pennsylvania, which does not require the submitted financial
recovery plan to include any discussion of the underlying political causes of the
city's financial woes.132
Further, this lack of critical analysis is compounded by the lack of public dis-
closure requirements regarding the financial takeover and its causes. In Michigan,
the emergency manager is only required to submit the financial and operating plan
to the public at an informational meeting after first submitting the plan to the state
treasurer and to the Chief Administrative Officer of the local government.133 The
statute is careful to note that this requirement does not mean the "emergency man-
ager must receive public approval before he or she implements the plan or any mod-
129. See WILLIAM E. THOMPSON & JOSEPH V. HICKEY, SOCIETY IN Focus: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCI-
OLOGY 120 (Pearson 5th ed. 2005). This definition correlates closely to academic definitions of "social struc-
ture," in the field of sociology. For example, one often cited textbook defines social structure as, "the ordered
relationships and patterned expectations that guide social interactions."
130. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1518 ("The plan shall have the objectives of assuring that the local
government is able to provide necessary or cause to be provided governmental services essential to the public
health, safety, and welfare and assuring the fiscal accountability of the local government.").
131. Id. § 141.1519 ("An emergency manager may ... [a]nalyze the factors and circumstances contrib-
uting to the financial emergency of the local government . . . .") (emphasis added).
132. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.703.
133. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1518(4).
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ification of the plan." 134 There is also no such public information requirement in
Pennsylvania's Act 47 process.135
The result is that even if the state intervenes to alleviate an emergency (and is
successful in doing so) it is still likely the underlying structural political problems
remain unaddressed. A case study illustrates this point. In 2003, the city of Pitts-
burgh faced massive deficits and was at risk of filing for bankruptcy.136
There were several causes for Pittsburgh's financial troubles, one of which was
the increasing cost of public services to a daytime population (residents and com-
muters into the city) that was much larger than its nighttime population (actual tax
base). The city was unable to tax the nonresident workers.137
Political causes as well. One of the most significant contributors to the problem
was that local government leaders were underfunding city pensions.138 Specifical-
ly, the city was using current revenues to meet wages, but placing only nominal
amounts into reserves to meet future cash requirements. The effect was to maintain
an apparent balance between incoming revenues and expenditures.139
To prevent default, the state appointed a financial board to initiate a recovery
plan. The board successfullyl 40 addressed the socioeconomic cause by allowing the
city to impose new taxes on non-resident workers, thus significantly raising reve-
nue. The state board, however, failed to address the underlying political causes.
For example, the Act 47 recovery plan included only three recommendations (of a
total of 209 recommendations) for adjustments to the pension system funding, none
of those mandated specific action to stop the chronic underfunding.141 Nor did the
plan include a discussion of the pension funding strategy and how it was clouding
the city's true financial picture. 142
In short, the Act 47 process temporarily put out the fire, but in the long term the
underlying political causes (a lack of political will to fully fund pension obliga-
tions) remained. The results speak for themselves: eight years later the state was
threatening to take over the pension fund for chronic underfunding.143 In fact, the
city council was so desperate to find a source of funding they had to conduct an
eleven-hour New Year's Eve session to identify a plan, which resulted in the deci-
134. Id.
135. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.703.
136. See, e.g., Kimbi, supra note 27, at 389.
137. See, e.g., Jack Ochs, The Roots of Pittsburgh s Financial Crisis, PITT. ECON. Q. 1 (Dec. 2005),
available at http://www.ucsur.pitt.edu/files/peq/peq_2005-12.pdf
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 27, at 390 ("Within a year the city eliminated its deficit, and was able to
return to the credit markets.").
141. There were three recommendations in the city's Act 47 plan as to pensions, all of which are phrased
as to be aspirational rather than clear mandates: 1) to make more timely payments, 2) to evaluate proposed
pension legislation and inform its state legislative delegation regarding the city's recommendations for poten-
tial changes, and 3) to reevaluate the city's pension contribution level. ECKERT SEAMANS, ATTORNEYS AT
LAW, MUNICIPALITIES FINANCIAL RECOVERY ACT RECOVERY PLAN CITY OF PITTSBURGH 86 (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/council/assets/04_ACT47PIan-Jel 1.pdf.
142. See id.




sion to siphon off future revenues from the Pittsburgh Parking Authority to fill the
gap.144 The financial distress fire burned again.
In contrast to the state intervention approach, Chapter 9 results in greater dis-
closure because of its specific statutory mandates to disclose the full extent of the
problem. For example, there are significant pre-filing disclosures before a munici-
pality can qualify for Chapter 9, such as providing a full list of the creditors - re-
gardless of the merit of those claims - that have potential claims against the city.145
Further, the filer must seek input from creditors and other stakeholders in the
development of a readjustment plan,146 encouraging further disclosures on the full
scope of financial difficulties. In the case of Orange County, the Governor (who
was concerned with the political ramifications of the filing) suggested the tempo-
rary appointment of a former state treasurer and auditor general to serve as a "turna-
round manager" for the county. The manager's job entailed extensive research into
Orange County's portfolio. The purpose of his research was to ensure the board of
supervisors understood the full extent of the pool's losses before developing a plan
to exit bankruptcy. 147 He reported his findings to both local officials and to the
state senate. 148
Even after a readjustment plan is settled, the inquiries do not stop. The filer
must still answer to objections by interested parties to the confirmation of the read-
justment plan.149 In addition, the filer is still subject to inquiries from the bankrupt-
cy judge who must approve or reject the plan. 50
The media also brings more information to light. In the aftermath of the bank-
ruptcy filing, Orange County made national headlines, many of which brought for-
ward uncomfortable findings (and even ridicule) to county officials.151 For exam-
ple, damaging internal reports were released that the board of supervisors ignored
warnings that more oversight was needed a year before the collapse of the invest-
144. Editorial, Pension Reprieve: The City Keeps Control, But There is Still Much to Do, PITT. POST GA-
ZETTE, Sep. 22, 2011, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/ll 1265/1176584-192.stm#ixzzljTZudUsl.
145. See, e.g., KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 30, at 23-24. The Bankruptcy Court also requires a filer to
prove it satisfies each eligibility requirements by submitting a number of pleadings and declarations. Further,
a filer must give notice by publication to bondholders providing details about the filing. Id
146. 11 U.S.C. § 943(6) (2006) (requiring the filer to obtain the necessary regulatory and electoral ap-
proval before a readjustment plan is confirmed by the Bankruptcy Judge).
147. See BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 122.
148. Id.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b).
150. Id.; see also KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 30, at 18-19 (Chapter 9 filings present a distinct ad-
vantage in the assignment of a judge. In a Chapter 9 filing, the Chief Judge of the circuit has broad authority
to appoint a specific judge to the case. This ensures the case is assigned to competent and very experienced
bankruptcy judges).
151. See BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 119; see also CONTRA COSTA CNTY. TAXPAYER Ass'N &
KELLY AND ASSOCIATES, LLP, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Inside Look at Vallejo, YOUTUBE (Uploaded June
26, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-aAmu82sHjC8. Vallejo City Councilwoman Stephanie Gomes
described that extensive media disclosures was one of the benefits of the city's filing: "All the abuse, the un-
due influence, the bad accounting practices, they all came to light. Very painful to have your dirty laundry
aired, especially national news all over the place, but it was important because it had been hidden for a long
time and the public didn't know what was going on. All of that came to light." CONTRA COSTA CNTY., supra
note 151.
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ment pool.152
These legislative mechanisms and media attention resulted in substantial dis-
closures. In turn, these disclosures uncovered the political causes of the county's
problems. For example, former state auditor Tom Hayes's reports to the state senate
unveiled the full scope of Bob Citron's (who was at that point in seclusion) invest-
ment strategy, which had been completely shielded from the view of voters and
other county officials.153
The result of these disclosures was that decision makers were aware of the
cause of the collapse, and thus able to identify and implement targeted solutions. In
Orange County, the reforms post-filing addressed the underlying political structure
itself at both the county and state level. For example, in the wake of the filing a
state law was passed that restricted the county treasurer's discretion in investment
decisions.1 54 Now all future county treasurers would have to prioritize investment
decisions to protect citizens' tax dollars: first, principal is protected, then, the li-
quidity needs of investors are protected, and, lastly, funds are used to secure a re-
turn. This reform is still in effect more than fifteen years after its initial passage.155
Advantage #2: The Chapter 9 option is less vulnerable to political conflicts of
interest
The Chapter 9 process is also less vulnerable to political conflicts of interest
that might conceal the political causes of default. Consider this hypothetical scenar-
io. City A has a large deficit and is labeled as being in a state of financial emergen-
cy. The governor has the authority to appoint a financial manager.156 This financial
manager serves at the complete behest of the governor.157 The governor appoints a
former advisor who is competent but also an ardent supporter.
Say now, the financial manager is compiling his operating plan to submit to the
governor. After much research, the financial manager believes it is in City A's in-
terest to join a lobbying effort already underway to repeal Law XYZ, which has
caused severe damage to City A's budget. He wants to include this provision in
his operating plan to the governor.
Law XYZ was a pet project of the governor's, who is up for reelection soon
(and has hopes for higher office). Would the financial manager encourage the mu-
nicipality to engage in the lobbying effort if he knew such a recommendation would
provide fodder to the governor's opponent? We hope so. However, we cannot be
certain the process is free from political conflicts of interests when a single individ-
152. BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 119-120.
153. Id. at 121-22. Tom Hayes, turnaround manager, reported his findings to the state senate: "I found a
portfolio that was highly leveraged, that was mismatched between the cash needs of the county and the length
of the maturity of investments [and one that had] over 60 percent concentration in derivative products." Id.
154. Id. at 188 (providing a description of SB 866).
155. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53600.3 (West 2011).
156. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1515(4).
157. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1515(5)(d).
158. A similar recommendation was included in the 2003 Act 47 plan for the city of Pittsburgh. See
ECKERT SEAMANS, supra note 141, at 4.
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ual (or group), who is appointed by a single political figure, is running the show. 159
In contrast, a Chapter 9 filing is less susceptible to political conflicts of interest
because multiple non-political parties are involved in uncovering the cause of the
city's default.160 For example, creditors have the power to form committees that
independently assess the acts, conduct, assets, and liabilities of the debtor city.161
Creditors can also participate in the formulation of the readjustment plan. If a cred-
itor thinks a readjustment plan does not address the root causes of the default, he
has every financial incentive to object to the fairness of the plan before it is con-
firmed. 162 Further, the readjustment plan is subject to the electorate approval under
local and state law. 163
Advantage #3: Chapter 9 creates a greater impetus for political reform
Voter anger is critical to the success of any political reform and a Chapter 9 fil-
ing creates plenty of it.164 One likely factor is that all stakeholders in a Chapter 9
filing are directly threatened by or hurt where it counts the most-the pocketbook. 165
This stands in contrast to the state takeover approach, where stakeholders are large-
ly shielded from financial pain and thus have less incentive to call for reform.
There are several reasons why this is true.
There are more interested parties in a Chapter 9 filing, all of which have a per-
sonal and financial stake in its outcome. Thus, they are more likely to demand
structural political reforms or, at the very least, support it.
First, there are the locality's constituents (voters and taxpayers). After all debts
159. Another more cynical conflict of interest would be if the financial manager or governor has a finan-
cial interest in any privatization deals in the community he is charged with overseeing. Accusations of this
nature have already arisen in state takeover of Benton Harbor, Michigan in April 2010. Ties have been
brought to light that the 2011 financial manager bill was sponsored by a state senator with prior ties to a de-
velopment company with plans to build a multi-million dollar golf course and residential development in Ben-
ton Harbor. The development went forward after the financial manager fired members of the Planning Com-
mission and Brownfield Redevelopment authority. Harbor Shores (as the development is now known) will
host the Senior P.G.A. Tour Championships. See Eclectablog, MI Gov. Rick Snyder's Takeover of Benton
Harbor Tied to Shoreline Development - What Rachel Missed, DAILY Kos (Apr. 19, 5:12 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/04/19/968278/-MI-Gov-Rick-Snyders-takeover-of-Benton-Harbor-tied-
to-shoreline-development-what-Rachel-missed; see also Jonathan Mahler, Now That the Factories Are
Closed, It's Tee Time in Benton Harbor, Mich., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/magazine/benton-harbor.html?pagewanted=all.
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2006); see also Talk of the Nation, supra note 51. The city of Vallejo had to
negotiate with attomeys representing over 1,000 claims against the city in the formulation of a readjustment
plan. Id.
161. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1103(c)(2) (West 2006 and Supp. 2012).
162. See id. § 943(b)(7) (a readjustment plan must be in the best interests of creditors and found to be
feasible in order to be confirmed).
163. See id. § 943(b)(6).
164. See BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 134 (one manifestation was voters' support for removing county
officials who were present when crisis began).
165. Intuitively, research has demonstrated that voters do indeed tend to reward politicians for good eco-
nomic times and punish them for the bad times. See Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Musical
Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability, Draft, Presentation at the Annual
Meeting of the Am. Political Sci. Ass'n (Sept. 1-5, 2004), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-bartels/chairs.pdf
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are discharged or settled, voters are bound to face substantial cuts to essential ser-
vices. These cuts serve to undermine the comfort of everyday life. For example, in
Orange County, most residents experienced increases in user fees including landfill,
dumping, planning, and permit fees.166 In Central Falls, taxpayers were greeted
with a 20 percent tax increase in the wake of their 2011 filing.167 In the aftermath
of the Vallejo bankruptcy filing, city government shrank by 25 percent and resi-
dents have learned to live without street maintenance for five years and with a vast-
ly reduced police force, among other shortages.168 While it is possible that service
cuts or tax increases may seem minimal in the aggregate, in the end it is the constit-
uents' perception that they are economically worse off that matters most.169
Bankruptcy also challenges the long-term financial security of government em-
ployees. For example, in Central Falls, pensions were cut for retired fire and police
personnel.170 The city of Vallejo, California, which emerged last year from Chapter
9, opted instead to cut pay and health care benefits.171 These moves have set de-
faulting localities on an expensive and time-consuming collision course with indi-
vidual constituents and labor unions. 172
Chapter 9 can also undermine the primary source of wealth for most American
families: their homes. For the majority of homeowners, home equity is the largest
source of personal savings. 173 Further, homeowners are acutely aware that local
amenities, public services, and tax increases are capitalized in the value of their
homes.174 While comprehensive studies on the effects of a Chapter 9 filing on
property values appear to exist, research does illustrate that tax increases, drops in
median income, resident exodus, and higher levels of unemployment have a nega-
tive effect on housing values.175  These are all possibilities when a city files for
Chapter 9.
166. See BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 178-79. Cuts were of course most dramatic for the poor in the
County. Id.
167. See Goodnough, supra note 119.
168. See Dan Springer, supra note 47.
169. See generally Achen & Bartels, supra note 165, at 5.
170. See Mary Williams Walsh, Cuts for the Already Retired, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/pension-deal-in-rhode-island-could-set-a-
trend.html?pagewanted-all (describing how in bankruptcy, retirees accepted a 55 percent cut in benefits - a
total that would range from losses between $4,000 and $46,000 a year). Prior to the bankruptcy filing, up to
60 percent of retirees retired on full disability pensions, drawing tax-free payments even after starting new
careers. Id.
171. Id.
172. For example, after filing for Chapter 9, the City of Vallejo faced lawsuits from labor unions as to
both their eligibility and to the legality of their rejection CBAs. These legal battles dragged on for more than 3
years, costing the city millions in extra expenditures. See Sara Coelho, A Distressed Municipality with a Plan:
The City of Vallejo's Plan of Adjustment, WElL BANKRUPTCY 13LOG (Jan. 13, 2012, 10:00 PM),
http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/a-distressed-municipality-with-a-planl-the-city-of-
vallejo%E2%80%99s-plan-of-adjustment/#axzzlj6PkaSTf.
173. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE 4 (2001).
174. Id.
175. See SETH PAYTON, IND. UNIV. CTR. URBAN POL'Y & ENV'T, PROPERTY TAXES AND LOCAL POLICY




Although the motivations are far from certain, the evidence indicates that Or-
ange County voters had strong opinions on local government reform after the cri-
sis.176 Further, they acted on those views. For example, voters took an affirmative
stand against new taxes to remedy the pool losses, illustrating their beliefs that lack
of funds was not the problem.' 7 7 A grassroots group emerged specifically to fight
Measure R - a sales tax increase touted to be the only way out of Chapter 9.1 The
measure was overwhelmingly defeated.179 In addition to active opposition, resi-
dents of the county expressed their strong belief that the answer to the crisis was to
limit the powers of the board of supervisors and to reduce the size of the bureaucra-
cy. so These sentiments were undoubtedly critical to political reform measures af-
ter the county emerged from Chapter 9 proceedings.s18
Voters were not the only parties incentivized to seek reform. State legislators
were worried about the effect on the state's own pocketbook in the aftermath of the
crisis,182 because the municipal bond market was also questioning their creditwor-
thiness. In response, legislation was proposed that would allow for a state takeo-
ver in the case of financial distress - a measure that would dramatically alter inter-
governmental relations.184
Political reforms also took hold after Vallejo's 2008 filing despite years of en-
trenched union influence on the City Council. According to City Councilwoman
Stephanie Gomes, voters were spurred to action after learning for the first time of
the six-figure salaries, some as high as $250,000, that various public employees
were making at a time when the city found itself on the brink of insolvency.185
Voter anger ensued and the community rallied to remove binding arbitration from
the city charter, a move that put the final vote on union contracts back in the hands
of the City Council for the first time in more than forty years.186
Creditors also have a strong incentive to support political reforms because their
own assets are significantly at risk during bankruptcy. Creditors stand at a disad-
176. See BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 184-185.
177. Id. at 159.
178. See Baldassare, supra 65, at 159; Peter M. Warren, Citizens Against the Tax Increase Pulls Together
Community, Business and GOP Leaders for Anti-Tax Campaign, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1995,
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-28/news/mn-59992 1_sales-tax-increase.
179. BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 160.
180. Id. at 187.
181. Id at 207 (for example, in November 1996 voters overwhelmingly passed a measure to limit the
term of members of the Orange County Board of Supervisors).
182. Id at 120.
183. Id.
184. Id at 163.
185. See CONTRA COSTA CNTY. TAXPAYER ASS'N & KELLY & AssoCs., LLP, Municipal Bankruptcy: An
Inside Look at Vallejo, YOUTUBE (June 26, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-aAmu82sHjC8.
186. Id. at 21:33. Describing the grassroots fight to remove binding arbitration from the city charter,
Councilwoman Gomes said: "We the community got together. They [the community] demanded it. The
Council put it on. And we worked really, really hard . .. [the unions] spent quite a lot of money, $100,000
fighting us on binding arbitration. We as a community raised probably $5,000, maybe $7,000. We were hand-
painting signs in my backyard and putting them up. And we won, we won ... very big deal for us because in
2012 those contracts are coming up again. And for the first time since probably the '60s the city council gets
to make the final decision on what we can afford to pay." Id.
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vantage in the readjustment plan process because a debtor can force an unfavorable
readjustment plan against their will.18 7 Further, bondholders of general obligation
bonds can be significantly impaired in the final plan.188 These possibilities illus-
trate that a Chapter 9 filing poses significant risks to bondholders and it is in their
economic best interest to support legislative efforts to avoid future filings.
In contrast, there are fewer interested parties in a state takeover, and those that
are interested have less incentive to push for reform. In a state takeover, creditors
still have an interest but a less immediate one. For example, in a state intervention
the creditors can rest assured that they will be paid in full. If they are not, they can
seek private action (in Chapter 9 the automatic stay prevents such action). This is
because a financial manager has no legal authority to unilaterally abrogate entire
debts, as is possible under Chapter 9. For example, in Michigan a financial manag-
er has only the authority to enter into agreements with creditors. Creditors are,
however, free to reject these proposals.189 In the end, the creditors will still be
paidl90 (unless Chapter 9 is an option), lowering their incentive to become involved
in the political reform process.
Further, the state intervention process itself might undermine the political will
of local government leaders to seek political reforms. There is a recognized reluc-
tance for state officials to intervene in local government finance because they are
not likely to get the credit for successes.191 Rather the local government leaders will
receive the credit.192 In fact, evidence shows some local officials actually want to
take the credit.193 Perhaps counter-intuitively, a state takeover (largely seen as a
threat to localities) might serve to undermine the political will to seek reforms that
would exist under a Chapter 9 filing by providing political cover for local officials.
This effect would be exacerbated by the fact that it is probable that the state would
not suffer the reputational damage expected under a Chapter 9 filing.
Moreover, the state intervention process can undermine voter participation in
political reform in two ways. First, voters might be placated because they are
shielded from sensitive information regarding the causes of the default, making it
less likely they will call for any reforms. This could occur if, as was described ear-
lier, no requirement existed that the financial manager must even study the caus-
es194 or where there is no requirement that a financial manager hold a public meet-
187. See Kimhi, supra note 27, at 357.
188. See Cate Long, How Jefferson County Trips Up National Reporters, MuniLand, REUTERS (Jan. 14,
2011, 10:00 PM),
http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2011/12/27/how-jefferson-county-trips-up-national-reporters/.
189. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1519(1)(w).
190. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1518(1)(b) (requiring the operating plan to account for payment
of all municipal securities).
191. See Kimhi, supra note 27, at 391.
192. Id.
193. For example, in the recent threatened takeover of the Pittsburgh pension system, two councilmen
supported the move - one calling it the only responsible option. See Joe Smydo, 2 Councilmen Favor State
Control of City Pension Fund, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 2012, http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/breaking/2-councilmen-favor-state-control-of-city-pension-fund-267835/.
194. As is the case in Michigan. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1519(1)(a).
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ing before creating the plan or attaining voter approval to implement it.195 These
factors are exacerbated if the plan does not make severe cuts that directly affect the
lives of voters in the distressed locality.196
Another way voter participation can be placated is through distraction from the
need for political reform. This was recently evident in resident responses to a pro-
posed state takeover in Benton Harbor, Michigan. The takeover was greeted not by
outrage at local officials for financial mismanagement, but at the Big Brother nature
of the emergency financial manager law itself.197 The takeover sparked accusations
of racisml98 and encouraged at least one type of political reform (though the type
necessarily needed): the repeal of the financial manager law itself.199
Advantage #4: The role of stigma
This stigma of bankruptcy itself can itself facilitate political reform by engag-
ing constituents to make demands on the tarnished city. Stigma is generally under-
stood as a mark of shame imposed on a certain group of individuals. 200 Researchers
have developed a more precise definition in order to provide clarity to the concept
and have identified five elements to stigma.201 The first four are that the label at-
tached must carry some social significance,202 negative stereotypes must be at-
tached to that label,203 there must be a resulting separation from "us" and "them"
from that labeling,204 and the stigmatized person or entity must experience some
status loss and discrimination. 205
These factors are present in the context of Chapter 11 (a strong corollary to
Chapter 9) filings where bankruptcy has been found to be a discrediting label.206
The label carries with it stereotypes that the firm is tainted and run by incompetent
individuals. Further, the label and its corresponding stereotypes apply broadly - to
the leaders responsible for the default, subsequent leaders, and the organization it-
self.207
195. Both of these are true under Michigan law. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1518 Sec. 18(4).
196. For example, Pittsburgh's Act 47 plan, which included no specific recommendations regarding cuts
to essential services for city residents. See ECKERT SEAMANS, supra note 141, at 3.
197. Eartha Jane Melzer, Benton Harbor Takeover Sparks Furious Reaction, MICH. MESSENGER, Apr. 20,
2011, http://michiganmessenger.com/48333/benton-harbor-takeover-sparks-furious-reaction.
198. See Eartha Jane Melzer, Benton Harbor is the New Selma, S.F. BAY VIEW, Apr. 29, 2011,
http://sfbayview.com/201 1/benton-harbor-is-the-new-selma/.
199. See id.
200. See Stigma definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, available at www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/stigma (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
201. See Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REv. Soc. 363, 367 (2001).
202. Id. at 368. A socially significant label should be contrasted with one that is merely an attribute, con-
dition, or mark. Id.
203. Former mental patients (label) are dangerous people (stereotype) is an example of this element.
204. Id. at 370. This element refers to the belief that negatively labeled persons are fundamentally differ-
ent from those who don't share the label. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Robert I. Sutton & Anita L. Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled Organizational Image
and Its Management, 30 ACAD. MGMT. 405, 405 (1987).
207. Id. at 406.
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There must be a power element to stigma as well. Whether or not a stigma at-
taches is entirely dependent on social, economic, and political power.208 In other
words, it does not attach unless the party attempting to attach the stigma has the
power to make it stick.209 Thus, one of the critical questions to ask is whether those
who might confer stigma are also in a position to control access to major life do-
mains?210
The answer in the context of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is "yes." 211 Research il-
lustrates that a bankruptcy filing can spoil the image of firms and their manage-
ment. Even more significantly, observers of such a firm would respond negatively
to that label, further threatening the viability of the firm in the future.212 Several
different categories of responses serve to make the bankruptcy label stick to the
tainted firm. For example, in a qualitative analysis of recently bankrupt computer
firms, one commonly reported negative reaction was complete disengagement.213
Other constituents responded not by severing relationships but by lowering the
quality of those relationships.214 Still others used new-found leverage215 to bargain
for more favorable exchange relationships. These reactions can manifest them-
selves in a number of ways in a bankrupt city. For example, might business leaders
choose to relocate in response to a Chapter 9 filing (disengage)? Or might potential
investors demand better (and more costly) tax incentives to locate in the city (better
exchange)? Even more critical, might bondholders decide to sell off the city's secu-
rities? Or, even worse, stop purchasing them altogether?
Evidence illustrates Chapter 9 stigma does in fact result in these types of nega-
tive reactions. In Orange County, the bond markets reacted to the bankruptcy by
demanding more favorable exchange terms. The county had to borrow $800 million
to pay its debts, at a higher yield and with the additional cost of bond insurance.216
In the wake of the filing, there was speculation that the bankruptcy label also had an
effect on consumer confidence nationwide - negatively impacting housing sales,
217consumer spending, and stunting job growth. On the other hand, evidence indi-
cates that the stigma does not last long. Just three years after the Chapter 9 filing,
208. Link & Phelan, supra note 202, at 375.
209. Id. at 376. In order for a stigma to stick, there must be an actual power difference between those
who have the label and those who do not. Id.
210. Major life domains in the individual context include entities such as educational institutions, jobs,
housing, and health care. Id. In the municipal context, these domains would likely include access to credit
markets and elected office. Id.
211. See Sutton & Callahan, supra note 207, at 405.
212. In the corporate context this audience includes customers, supplies, top management, venture capi-
talists, stockholders, banks, user groups, and creditors. Id. at 410. In the municipal context, this might in-
clude voters, state government officials, bondholders, and current (or potential) investors.
213. See id. at 416. For example, a sample of computer firms revealed that some customers stopped buy-
ing products altogether and suppliers severed relationships. Id.
214. Id. at 416-17. One example included a supplier who chose to continue doing business with the firm
sending a lower quality of goods to the firm because of the firm's perceived incompetence. Id. at 417.
215. Power shifts when an investor decides to completely disengage from the firm, because the firm be-
comes more dependent on the remaining investors - thus the remaining investors can assert greater power
over the firm. Id.
216. BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 180.
217. Id at 182.
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Wall Street raised Orange County's credit rating.218 This allowed the county to
borrow once again at lower rates and without bond insurance.219 Even voter opti-
mism rebounded rapidly.220
Despite its nonpermanent nature, the concept of stigma presents significant po-
tential to facilitate political reform for two reasons. First, in the short-term the
stigma's effects are real. Thus, if decision-makers strike while the bankruptcy is a
fresh memory in constituents' minds then political reforms can take hold.221 This
makes sense for several reasons. Research indicates that stigma brings with it the
ruining of relationships with constituents who lose trust in the firm's compe-
tence.222 In response, the city's constituents exert their own control by reacting to
the city's default through various means: disengagement, withdrawing, and de-
manding more favorable relationships. It is in the city's best interest to rebuild
those relationships because their financial and political health depends on doing
so.223 These relationships take tremendous work to rebuild - and when a firm is a
municipal government, political reforms are a natural part of that process. Orange
County did just that: enacting critical legislation that mirrored voters' calls for new
exchange relationships.
Even the lingering effects can serve the purpose of political reform by imposing
a painful political memory on the city. For example, the stigma could serve as a po-
litical ghost that continues to haunt future political leaders by reminding them of
what could be if they revert to the pre-crisis policies. The current chairman of the
Orange County board of supervisors, John Moorlach, described it best: "It gave us a
scarlet letter.. . . We will always be known as the county that went bankrupt." 224
This sentiment was expressed more than 17 years after the crisis ended. It is possi-
ble that the painful political memory could contribute to the sustainability of the re-
forms enacted during the painful years following a filing.225 There have not been
218. Shelby Grad, Moody's Boosts Orange County Bond Rating, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997,
http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/18/news/mn-65476.
219. Id.
220. BALDASSARE, supra note 65, at 210-214.
221. See generally id. at 187-210. For example, Orange County was buzzing with proposals for reform in
the two years following the filing: HB 866 (County Treasurer Reform) was passed in 1996. Id. at 189; Meas-
ure T (to create County Charter) ultimately rejected in 1996. Id. at 197. Measure A (term limits for Board of
Supervisors) passed in 1996. Id. at 207.
222. See Sutton & Callahan, supra note 207, at 417; see also Talk of the Nation, supra note 51 (highlight-
ing former Interim City Manager of Vallejo, California Phil Batchelor's explanation that the effect of stigma
is not limited solely to current investors, but possibly to potential ones as well: "You want people to come and
to establish their business in your entity. It brings in jobs. It brings in tax revenues that help pay the bills. And
when you have a label of bankruptcy, it makes it very difficult for people to get serious about relocating to
your jurisdiction.").
223. See Sutton & Callahan, supra note 207, at 420 (explaining how bankruptcy stigma can hamper a
firm's ability to establish new relationships that are necessary for survival); see also BALDASSARE, supra note
59, at 201.
224. See Adam Elmahrek, Does Bankruptcy Await Santa Ana?, VOICE OF OC (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://voiceofoc.org/oc-central/article-bce463ac-f34b-l 1 e0-af64-00lcc4c002e0.html.
225. A small example: the Board of Supervisors is still elected and subject to term limits. See Your Board
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enough filings to know, but there is promise.
Conclusion
This note is not intended to trivialize the enormous costs a municipality suffers
in bankruptcy. Those effects are real - and can include job losses, retirement cuts,
cuts to public services, increases in crime, and the possibility of further economic
decline. This note is meant to illustrate that the benefits of Chapter 9 are more nu-
anced than readjustment of debts. The process, while painful, can force to light the
true causes of default, motivate constituents to act on those causes, and make it
more likely that those reforms outlast the crisis.
A thorough discussion of the benefits and costs of a Chapter 9 filing is particu-
larly pertinent in the current economic climate where both states and cities are fac-
ing the consequences of financial mismanagement. In this context, critical questions
need to be asked: is a state in a similar financial situation as its distressed locality
really in the best position to address the causes of a locality's default? Even if the
state steps in, does it have the leverage necessary to force critical stakeholders, in-
cluding unions and bondholders, into negotiations? Once a state leaves a munici-
pality, what mechanisms remain in place to discourage further mismanagement af-
ter the crisis is abated and the financial manager has left?226 Further, what is plan B
if the state takeover approach, as modeled in Michigan, falls victim to repeal or
even state constitutional challenge? 227
Chapter 9 should remain a last resort, but its potential benefits illustrate it
should also remain a viable option for localities that have financial and political
problems beyond the help of temporary stopgap measures. These include munici-
palities that have long suffered from endemic political corruption, financial mis-
management, or have been consistently burdened by demands from politically in-
fluential unions or other special interest groups. Chapter 9 is by no means a perfect
solution these ends, but its benefits illustrate it is an option that is at the very least
worth serious consideration.
Addendum to Note
On August 3, 2012, the Michigan State Supreme Court issued a writ of man-
226. This is an especially critical question to ask because the record of success of the financial manager
approach is questionable at best in certain locales. For example, the city of Scranton, Pennsylvania has re-
mained on the state's Act 47 recovery process for nearly 20 years and is still on the brink of filing for bank-
ruptcy. See Eric Boehm, Scranton Could Join National Trend ofBankrupt Cities, Despite Officials' Opposi-
tion, PA. INDEP. (July 17, 2012), http://paindependent.com/2012/07/4016/; Maureen Mackey, Scranton's
Fiscal Mess May Lead to Bankruptcy, FISCAL TIMES (July 11, 2012),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/07/l l/Scrantons-Fiscal-Mess-May-Lead-to-
Bankruptcy.aspx#LARfgZTcmt76jdc8.99.
227. PA 4 was repealed in the November 6 state-wide election. Paul Egan & John Gallagher, Michigan
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damus directing the State Board of Canvassers to certify a referendum on Public
Act 4 for the November 2012 ballot.228 As a result, Michigan's emergency manager
law was suspended. 229 On November 6th, PA 4 was subsequently repealed by vot-
ers.230 There is a legal debate underway as to whether the repeal of PA 4 leaves
emergency managers without legal authority to govern.231
After the initial suspension of PA 4, Michigan State Attorney General, Bill
Schuette offered his legal opinion that PA 72, the predecessor to PA 4, was auto-
matically revived until certification of the November 2012 general election re-
sults.232 Further, if PA 4 was repealed, Schuette believed PA 72 would be perma-
nently revived. The result is that legal authority still exists for continued operation
of the emergency financial manager system. Yet, local officials who are under the
power of the Emergency Managers233 took action to question the authority of the
Financial Managers in light of the suspension.
For example, the elected school board of the Detroit Public Schools filed suit to
undo the actions of emergency manager, Roy Roberts, in the wake of the state Su-
preme Court's decision.234 Specifically, DPS sought to void Roberts' order to place
15 of Detroit's failing schools under the guise of the state's Educational Achieve-
ment Authority, a statewide district of the state's lowest performing schools. 235
The school board argued that once Public Act 4 was suspended the state was
left with no emergency manager law because Public Act 4 repealed Public Act 72.
As a result, the school board should be in charge and Roberts should step down.236
Judge Stephen Murphy disagreed - holding that suspension does not invalidate any
of the former actions of the Emergency Manager. Further, Judge Murphy held that
Public Act 72 is now in effect. Still, Judge Murphy acknowledged that because
228. See generally Stand Up STAND UP for Democracy v. Sec'y of State, 492 Mich. 588 (2012).
229. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.477 (2012) ("[A] law that is the subject of the referendum continues
to be effective until the referendum is properly invoked, which occurs when the board of state canvassers
makes its official declaration of the sufficiency of the referendum petition.")
230. See Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Emergency Manager Law: What's next after Public Act 4 repeal?
MLIVE (Nov. 11, 2012),
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/1 /michigan emergency manager law.html.
23 1. Id.
232. STATE OF MICHIGAN BILL SCHUETTE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION 7267 (2012), available at
http://www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C419306486.PDF.
233. Four cities (Benton Harbor, Ecorse, Flint, and Pontiac) and three school districts (Detroit, Highland
Park, and Muskegon Heights) have appointed managers. Three more cities (Detroit, Inkster, and River Rouge)
operate under consent agreements with the state. See Dawson Bell, High court's decision to put emergency
manager repeal on ballot touches off power struggle, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 4, 2012),
http://www.freep.com/article/20120804/NEWS06/308040118/High-court-s-decision-to-put-emergency-
manager-repeal-on-ballot-touches-off-power-struggle.
234. Zoe Clark, DPS Finances, NEWS ROUNDUP (Aug. 15, 2012 at 7:05am),
http://michiganradio.org/people/zoe-clark.
235. STATE OF MICHIGAN EDUCATION ACHIEVEMENT AUTHORITY,
http://www.michigan.gov/eaa/0,4841,7-281-59278---,00.html (last visited Sep. 29, 2012). ("The Education
Achievement System (EAS) is a new statewide school system that will assume operation of the lowest 5 per-
cent of performing schools in the state of Michigan that are not achieving satisfactory results on a redesign
plan or that are under an Emergency Manager.") http://www.michigan.gov/eaa/0,4841,7-281-59278---
,00.html.
236. Clark, supra note 224. http://michiganradio.org/people/zoe-clark.
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Public Act 72 provided only financial emergency powers, Roberts is in charge of
finances, but that the Board now retains control over academics.237
Other cities are charging forward with their own challenges despite this ruling.
In September, City Council members in Pontiac, Flint, and Benton Harbor also filed
suit to remove their own emergency managers.238 These suits are likely to become
even more urgent now that PA 4 has been repealed.
There are several fundamental questions that will need to be answered in the
coming months in the wake of PA's repeal. Specifically, if not the Emergency
Manager, who is in charge of the various municipalities and school districts operat-
ing under PA 4 authority? What will happen to the various consent decrees and con-
tractual arrangements entered into under PA 4 authority? If PA 72 is not revived,
what preventative legislation will replace PA 4? Lastly, in the face of weakened
Emergency Manager system, will bankruptcy arise as a viable option for distressed
Michigan cities? The legal wrangling to answer these questions has only just begun.
237. Id.
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